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CONTRACT LAW-THE COLLISION OF TORT AND CONTRACT LAW:
VALIDITY AND ENFORCEABILITY OF EXCULPATORY CLAUSES IN
ARKANSAS. Jordan v. Diamond Equipment, 2005 WL 984513 (2005).
I. INTRODUCTION
"And the Lord said: Let there be contracts and Let there be torts. And
it was so. And He divided contracts from torts."' Unfortunately, in some
situations the line separating contracts from torts is not as clear and defini-
tive as the Lord may have intended. 2 Instead of a clear line, the border be-
tween torts and contracts is an uncertain, and at times, confusing area
shaded in gray.3 In this gray area, the difficult question emerges of whether,
or under what conditions, may a contract limit or "exculpate" tort liability.4
Tort law provides that a party to whom a duty of care is owed can pur-
sue damages against another for acts that breach that duty, if those acts were
reasonably foreseeable to lead to the harm and were the proximate cause of
that harm.5 At common law, a person was prohibited from using a contract
to avoid potential liability for the negligent breach of that duty of care.6
Under modem law, the conflict between tort and contract law arises when
parties to a contract agree to limit the duty of care through the use of an
exculpatory clause.7 The issue at the intersection of contract and tort law is
whether such a contract remains enforceable under contract law, or whether
the contract violates tort law and is therefore void as against public policy.
8
An exculpatory clause is "[a] contractual provision relieving a party
from any liability resulting from a negligent or wrongful act." 9 This note
examines the Arkansas Supreme Court's recent decision in Jordan v. Dia-
mond Equipment & Supply Co., 10 and the requirements, parameters, and
conditions necessary for Arkansas courts to hold exculpatory clauses valid
1. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 346
n.315b (1960); See also Natasha V. Konon, Note, Sommer v. Federal Signal Corp.: Clarify-
ing the Confusion Over the Tort/Contract Borderland and the Rules of Contribution, 14
PACE L. REV. 543, 543 (1994).
2. Konon, supra note 1, at 543.
3. Id.
4. See Keith Bruett, Note, Can Wisconsin Businesses Safely Rely Upon Exculpatory
Contracts to Limit Their Liability?, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 1081, 1081 (1998).
5. G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REv. 431,
461 (1993).
6. J.D. LEE & BARRY LINDAL, 1 MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 9.07
(2d ed. 1993).
7. See Konon, supra note 1, at 543.
8. Appellant's Joint Appendix at 123, Jordan v. Diamond Equip. & Supply Co., No.
04-1113, 2005 WL 984513 (Ark. Apr. 28, 2005).
9. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 588 (7th ed. 1999).
10. No. 04-1113, 2005 WL 984513 (Ark. Apr. 28, 2005) ("Jordan").
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and enforceable in light of that decision. After a review of the pertinent
facts of Jordan," this note briefly examines the historical development and
general use of exculpatory clauses in America from the beginning of the
twentieth century to present, and then specifically in Arkansas.' 2 This note
then examines the analysis and reasoning in the Jordan decision. 13 This note
concludes with a discussion of the potential effects and implications of the
Jordan decision on consumers in Arkansas, and an investigation into the
possible consequences if the rule of law relating to exculpatory clauses




Michael Jordan earned his living as a landscaper.' 5 On October 31,
2001, he was engaged in a landscaping project in Benton County, Arkan-
sas. 16 The project required the transportation of loose gravel to the top of a
slope at a customer's job site.17 To accomplish this task, Jordan visited
Diamond Equipment and Supply Company ("Diamond") for the purpose of
renting an appropriate piece of equipment. 18 Diamond was in the business of
renting and leasing tools and equipment to the public.' 9 Jordan did not come
to Diamond to rent any "specific" piece of equipment; instead, he sought the
advice of Diamond personnel as to the appropriate piece of equipment to
accomplish the job.20 Based on Diamond's recommendation, Jordan rented
(for one day) a piece of equipment called a Bobcat Model 763 Skid-Steer
Loader ("Bobcat"). 2' The rental contract that Jordan signed for the Bobcat
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Parts V & VI.






21. Jordan, 2005 WL 984513, at *1. Plaintiff's counsel described the Bobcat as follows:
The Bobcat loader is a four-wheel rubber-tired gasoline-powered machine
equipped with a bucket in the front actuated by hydraulic cylinders and is de-
signed, when so equipped, for the purpose of loading, transporting, and dumping
loose materials. It has a short wheel base and a high center of gravity. It is so de-
signed that when empty 70% of the vehicle weight is carried by the rear wheels
and when the bucket is filled to the recommended maximum capacity, 70% of
[Vol. 28
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contained an exculpatory clause.22 In relevant part, the exculpatory clause
read:
Diamond Equipment Rental and Supply, Inc. is not responsible for inju-
ries or damages sustained in the use of these items whether the damages
are due to neglect, mechanical failure, or any other cause whatsoever,
regardless of who happens to be operating the equipment. The lessee as-
sumes full liability from the time the equipment is rented until it is re-
turned. The lessee accepts the items in the "as is" condition and does
hereby absolve and relieve lessors from any liability by reason of or re-
sulting from the condition of the rented items....Any repairs made to
items listed in this contract by anyone other than a lessor or its employee
shall be the sole responsibility of the lessee, unless written authority for
said repairs is granted by Diamond Equipment Rental and Supply, Inc.
23
In the course of moving the materials up the slope, the Bobcat became
top-heavy and overturned, rolling over several times on its way down the
slope.24 As a result, Jordan suffered permanent spinal injuries.25
B. Procedural Posture
Jordan commenced an action in negligence against Diamond.26 Jordan
alleged, inter alia, that the exculpatory clause did not relieve Diamond from
liability for: (1) failing to advise him of the operating parameters and limita-
tions of the Bobcat; and (2) failing to provide him with adequate instruc-
tions and warnings necessary for the safe operation of the equipment.27
the total vehicle weight is carried by the front wheels. As a consequence of its
design, it is highly unstable when operated on inclines. Also as a consequence of
its design, it is subject to a sudden change in the location of the center of gravity
when the bucket is either filled or dumped.
Joint Appendix at 5-6, Jordan (No. 04-1113).
22. Jordan, 2005 WL 984513, at *3.
23. Id.
24. Id. at * 1.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. Specifically, Jordan's theory of negligence consisted of:
(1) failure to take into account in advising Jordan of the appropriate machine for
the conditions and circumstances under which he intended to use it; (2) failure to
adequately instruct Jordan as to the safe operating procedures and conditions
upon which the machine could be safely operated; (3) failure to advise Jordan of
the stability characteristics of the machine and of the difference in distribution of
weight bias in loaded versus unloaded conditions; (4) failure to warn Jordan that
the Bobcat loader was unsuited for use of loading or unloading materials upon
an inclined surface, which could have been reasonably anticipated by Diamond;
(5) failure to warn Jordan that the Bobcat loader was suitable for use, including
loading and unloading, only on relatively flat surfaces; and (6) failure to instruct
2006]
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Diamond denied the allegations but asserted the exculpatory language in the
agreement as an affirmative defense and moved for summary judgment.2 8
The trial court ruled that the exculpatory clause, even though located on the
reverse side of the rental contract, was conspicuous, clear, and unambigu-
ous, and that "the exculpatory clause sets out what negligent liability is to
be avoided in very clear language., 29 Accordingly, the trial court granted
Diamond's motion for summary judgment, and Jordan subsequently ap-
pealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court.3° Jordan's main point on appeal was
that the trial court should have found the exculpatory language unenforce-
able as against public policy. 31 Conversely, Diamond argued that the excul-




Exculpatory clauses, also referred to as "hold harmless" clauses, 33 ex-
empt parties from responsibility for the consequences of their actions.34 A
party seeking to limit its liability by means of a contractual provision is ini-
tially given the benefit of the doubt by a legal system that generally respects
the rights of parties to agree and contract as they see fit. 35 However, the
judiciary's deference to the sanctity of contract has its limits. 36 Although
exculpatory clauses are not illegal per se, "contracts that exempt a party
from liability" for negligence are not favored by the law.37 "This disfavor is
based upon the strong public policy of encouraging the exercise of care. 38
Traditionally, courts have been concerned that such agreements might: (1)
and educate its personnel as to the proper operating procedures of skid-steer
loaders and of the stability characteristics of these machines.
Id.





33. Bruett, supra note 4, at 1082-83.
34. Dobratz v. Thomson, 468 N.W.2d 654, 657 n.1 (Wis. 1991) (defining exculpatory
contracts as seeking "to release one or more of its parties from at least some liability result-
ing from any negligent act or omission or other wrongful act by that party"); see also Bruett,
supra note 4, at 1082.
35. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.29a (2d ed. 2001).
36. See id.
37. Plant v. Wilbur, 345 Ark. 487, 493, 47 S.W.3d 889, 893 (2001); see also Farmers
Bank v. Perry, 301 Ark. 547, 787 S.W.2d 645 (1990); Middleton & Sons v. Frozen Food
Lockers, 251 Ark. 745, 474 S.W.2d 895 (1972); Ark. Power & Light Co. v. Kerr, 204 Ark.
238, 161 S.W.2d 403 (1942); Gulf Compress Co. v. Harrington, 90 Ark. 256, 119 S.W. 249
(1909).
38. Jordan, 2005 WL 984513, at *2; see also 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 281 (2004).
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promote behavior by those performing services that is dangerous or injuri-
ous to the public; and (2) shift the risk of loss and associated costs to those
not able or best suited to bear them.39 Although invalidating contracts to
uphold public policy is generally recognized to be within the province and
power of the judiciary, it is also incumbent upon the judiciary to uphold
freedom of contract.40 Generally, assuming a contract is willingly entered
into, the contract is enforceable by the courts if it does not otherwise violate
public policy.41 When the judiciary invalidates contracts to uphold public
policy, the question arises as to how far, in the absence of clear guidance
from constitutional or legislative sources, courts should extend judicial pub-
lic policy factors in determining the validity of otherwise enforceable con-
tracts. 42 If the judiciary engaged in a detailed, substantive review of the pro-
visions of every litigated contract, the court system would be overwhelmed
and individual parties would suffer the loss of freedom and predictability of
their contractual and economic outcomes.4 3 Thus, courts must be sensitive
in balancing their views regarding the interaction between public policy
concerns and the fundamental right of contract. 44 Because judges draw not
only on constitutional or statutory law, but also on their own developing
perceptions as to what constitutes public interest or morality, judges can
only administer public policy justice at some cost to contractual freedom
and uncertainty of market transactions.45
This section briefly addresses the factors used when determining the
validity and enforceability of exculpatory clauses.46 With these factors in
mind, it then reviews the history and development of exculpatory clauses in
America from the Lochner era forward to the modem era (post-1970).47
This section concludes with a review of the history and development of
exculpatory clauses specifically in Arkansas and the changing attitudes re-
lated to exculpatory clauses by the modem Arkansas judiciary.48
39. SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 12:2 (4th ed., Richard A. Lord
ed., 1998); see also Shell, supra note 5, at 461.
40. WILLISTON, supra note 38, at § 12:3.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Shell, supra note 5, at 438-39.
44. WILLISTON, supra note 38, at § 12:3.
45. Shell, supra note 5, at 440-41.
46. See infra Part III.A.
47. See infra Parts III.B. & C.
48. See infra Parts III.D. & E.
2006]
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A. Factors in Determining the Validity and Enforcement of Exculpatory
Clauses
The Second Restatement of Contracts offers the following guidelines
regarding the validity of exculpatory clauses:
§ 195 Term Exempting From Liability for Harm Caused Intentionally,
Recklessly, or Negligently
(1) A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused inten-
tionally or recklessly is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.
(2) A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused neg-
ligently is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if:
(a) the term exempts an employer from liability to an employee for
injury in the course of his employment;
(b) the term exempts one charged with a duty of public service
from liability to one to whom that duty is owed for compensation for
breach of that duty, or
(c) the other party is similarly a member of a class protected
against the class to which the first party belongs.
(3) A term exempting a seller of a product from his special tort liabil-
ity for physical harm to a user or consumer is unenforceable on grounds
of public policy unless the term is fairly bargained for and is consistent
with the policy underlying that liability.
49
Paragraphs one and two of section 195 outline liability for which ex-
culpation will not be permitted as a matter of law, while paragraph three
discusses conditions in which an exculpatory clause can be held valid and
enforceable. 50 Because of the unreasonable risk to the general welfare, both
the Restatements of Torts and Contracts invalidate exculpatory clauses that
attempt to limit liability for harm caused intentionally or recklessly.5' Thus,
by specific rule, liability for intentional torts cannot be contractually ne-
gated. 52 Some courts further extend the ban on contractual negation of inten-
tional torts to include negligent acts that are wantonly or recklessly commit-
ted.53 Paragraph two designates several relationships in which liability for
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: TERM EXEMPTING FROM LIABILITY FOR
HARM CAUSED INTENTIONALLY, RECKLESSLY OR NEGLIGENTLY § 195 (1981).
50. Id.
51. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 282, 500, 892, 892D (1965).
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (emphasis added).
53. Id. The rules forbidding contractual exculpation of intentional torts have not
changed for generations and thus will not be the focus of this note. Id.
[Vol. 28
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ordinary negligence cannot be exculpated as a matter of law.54 When one
party to the contract is a member of a "protected" class, liability exemption
for even ordinary negligence will not be permitted.55 Most notably, these
protected classes consist of: employer-employee relationships; landlord-
tenant relationships; and persons charged with a duty of public service (e.g.
railroads, common carriers, public utilities).56 In these types of relation-
ships, one party will usually possess superior bargaining power; thus, in
order to promote reasonable care, complete exculpation of negligence liabil-
ity is not permitted as a matter of public policy.57 Paragraph three of section
195 provides guidelines for relationships (other than those relationships
detailed in paragraph two, in which negligence exculpation is forbidden),
under which an exculpatory clause can be held valid and enforceable.
58
Contracts containing exculpatory clauses aimed at negating liability for
ordinary negligence (the primary issue in Jordan) will be the focus of this
note.
B. Development and Treatment of Exculpatory Clauses in America Dur-
ing the Lochner Era
As evidenced by the development of the doctrine of economic substan-
tive due process, the Lochner59 era is generally considered the high point for
freedom of contract. 60 Nevertheless, "[t]he Lochner Court was deeply sus-
picious of contractual clauses significantly limiting or disclaiming liability
for negligence.,, 61 Around the turn of the twentieth century, in a series of
cases involving injury to people or property, the United States Supreme
Court established an immutable rule that demanded reasonable care from
contracting parties regardless of any contractual limitation of negligence
liability.62 In one of the earliest cases, The Steamer Syracuse,63 a canal boat,
which was being towed from Albany to New York City, was damaged (and
subsequently sank) by the tug master as he maneuvered through the busy
New York harbor.64 The Court ruled that an exculpatory clause contained in





58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195.
59. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)) ("Lochner").
60. Shell, supra note 5, at 445.
61. Id. at 461.
62. Id. at 461-62.
63. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 167 (1870).
64. Id. at 167.
2006]
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master and owner," was unenforceable and could not eliminate the tug mas-
ter's duty of reasonable care. 65 The Court opined that the exculpatory lan-
guage in the contract was ineffective because the damage to the canal boat
was the result of negligence; thus, the tug company was liable for the dam-
age regardless of previous contractual limitations.66 Even during the
Lochner era's increased emphasis on freedom of contract, the Court held
accountability for negligent actions to an even higher priority than freedom
of contract.67
In 1889, the Court again affirmed its immutable rule of liability regard-
ing negligent actions regardless of contractual exculpation in Liverpool and
Great Western Steam Company v. Phenix Insurance Company. 68 In Liver-
pool, a steamship loaded with cargo departed from New York bound for
England.69 The bills of lading executed between the carrier and its cargo
customers included a broad exculpatory clause that exempted from liability,
among other things, any losses due to negligence. 70 As the vessel ap-
proached her destination, foggy weather hampered the navigation efforts of
the captain. 7' This resulted in the steamer's running aground and losing a
portion of its cargo.72 Contrary to the holding of the New York trial court,
the United States Supreme Court ruled that public policy prohibited com-
mon carriers from limiting liability for their own negligence.73 The Court
observed that the unequal bargaining power of the customers as against the
carrier resulted in customers simply accepting the bills of lading because
they did not have adequate time or resources to seek other carriers or pursue
redress in the courts.74 The Court held that the nature of the bill of lading
and its corresponding exculpatory clause forced customers to accept the
document in its entirety or else abandon their business. 75 In essence, the
Court was concerned with the apparent inability of customers to effectively
negotiate with providers of limited or monopolistic services.7 6
65. Id. at 170.
66. Id. at 171.
67. See Shell, supra note 5, at 462.
68. 129 U.S. 397 (1889) ("Liverpool").
69. Id. at 435.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 436.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 441-42. The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court under a
federal Admiralty law claim. Id. at 398. The United States Supreme Court's decision was
contrary to the laws of New York and England, both of which would have permitted and
enforced the exculpatory clause in the contract. See id. at 461.
74. Liverpool, 129 U.S. at 441.
75. Id.
76. Shell, supra note 5, at 463.
[Vol. 28
CONTRACT LAW
The Court was equally disapproving of legislative acts that contained
provisions that permitted the enforcement of exculpatory clauses in some
contractual situations. 7 Even as legislative actions specifically aimed at
lessening restrictions on the enforcement of such exculpatory clauses devel-
oped, the Court continued to demonstrate its disfavor by narrowly constru-
ing these legislative acts.78 For instance, "in a striking series of cases fol-
lowing the passage of the Harter Act in 1893, 7 9 the Court narrowly con-
strued provisions limiting shipowners' liability in order to preserve the
rights to due care enjoyed by cargo shippers.
80
In addition, "the Court construed the Hepburn Act of 190681 as pre-
serving its decision in Railroad Co. v. Lockwood,82 despite evidence in the
text of the statute that Congress meant to acknowledge the practice of giv-
ing drovers 'free' railroad passes by limiting carrier liability. 83
In summary, even though the judiciary during the Lochner era held
freedom of contract in high regard, when judges perceived significant un-
77. See id. at 465.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 466. (46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 (1988).
In 1893, Congress passed the Harter Act in response to strong objections from
American shipowners to the Court's invalidation of negligence exculpation
clauses in maritime shipping contracts. British courts recognized the validity of
such exculpation clauses, while the United States Supreme Court did not. This
put American ship owners at a competitive disadvantage because American ship
owners were forced to load their rates to cover the cost of insurance while Brit-
ish owners could shift this cost to their customers.
Id. at n.205.
80. Shell, supra note 5, at 466.
81. Id. "(Act of June 29, 1906 (Hepburn Act), ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584, (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 11104 (1982 & Supp. V 1987))." Id. at n.202.
82. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873). In Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, the Court considered
the situation in which a drover, who was shipping cattle on a train and was personally enti-
tled by legislative act to ride for free, was forced to sign an exculpatory clause relieving the
railroad from all liability for injury to himself or his cattle. Id. at 359. The drover was injured
by the negligent acts of the railroad and subsequently brought an action against it. Id. The
railroad defended itself by alleging the validity of the exculpatory clause. Id. The Court held
that even though the drover had not paid for the ticket, and was riding on a "drover's pass," a
common carrier cannot lawfully exculpate its liability for negligence regardless of whether a
passenger had paid full price or was riding for free. Id. at 384.
83. Shell, supra note 5, at 465; See Norfolk S. R.R. v. Chatman, 244 U.S. 276, 280
(1917).
The Hepburn Act regulated railroads by, inter alia, barring the issuance of 'free
passes' to passengers except as necessary to enable drovers and others handlers
to take care of their livestock and produce. The railroads argued that this statute
constituted legislative recognition that drovers rode free and that negligence ex-
culpations were now enforceable as to these handlers, as they were against other
passengers who rode for free. The Court disagreed and construed the Hepburn
Act to have preserved the rule against negligence exculpations by railroads.
Shell, supra note 5, at 204.
2006]
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fairness, uneven bargaining power, or the potential for lack of reasonable
care, they invalidated exculpatory clauses in order to vindicate perceived
public policy principals.84
C. Development and Treatment of Exculpatory Clauses During the Mod-
em (Post- 1970) Era
Because by the modem era specific legislation had been enacted to ad-
dress many of the public policy concerns of the Lochner era courts, modem
courts have tended to shift their focus away from public policy towards the
efficiency of the market.8 5 Of the competing economic theories influencing
the modem judiciary, the most prevalent has been the "efficiency" theory.86
Law and economics scholars believe that, in order to encourage and pro-
mote productive economic growth, predictable laws relating to property and
contracts must exist in society.87 These scholars believe that predictable
laws, particularly laws oriented toward businesses, will result in accurately
anticipated costs, increased economic incentives, and maximized wealth.88
Law and economics scholars focus primarily on the unadulterated efficiency
of the market and strongly resist restrictive or immutable judicial market
interference based on public policy concerns.89 Partially in response to the
developing theory of market efficiency, the modem judiciary has tended to
reduce the sources and occurrences of judicial interference or invalidation
of contracts and has tended to defer to the individual state's (generally) less
restrictive interpretations of public policy.90 Modem courts also place
greater emphasis on determining the exact nature of the parties and the
transaction; specifically, whether the contract involves a matter that pre-
dominately affects the public versus a private interest.91 Unlike Lochner era
predecessors, if a contract involves a purely private transaction, or even a
transaction that affects only a small portion of the public, modern courts
will usually refuse to invalidate contractual provisions on public policy
grounds.92 If the public interest is not implicated, private parties to a con-
tract are free to allocate risk among themselves in any manner they see fit.
9 3
The modern judiciary has minimized many of the traditional concerns re-
lated to the bargaining process and public policy vigilance and has instead
84. Shell, supra note 5, at 467.
85. Id. at 492.
86. Id. at 502.
87. Id. at 497
88. Id.
89. Id. at 497.
90. Shell, supra note 5, at 492,
91. See WILLISTON, supra note 38, at § 19:22.
92. See Shell, supra note 5, at 525.
93. WILLISTON, supra note 38, at § 19:22.
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created doctrines that strongly favor a policy of strict contract construction
and inherent market efficiency.94 Thus, few modem contracts that are not
already regulated by legislation or prohibited by criminal law are found to
possess the degree of risk of harm to the general public necessary to be in-
validated by the courts.9 Those few contracts that rise to the level necessary
to warrant the modem judiciary's public policy evaluation are evaluated
under the following guidelines:
Exculpatory adhesion contracts may be said to violate public policy
when it exhibits some, but not necessarily all, of following factors: (1) it
concerns business generally thought suitable for public regulation, (2)
party seeking exculpation performs service of great importance to pub-
lic, which is often matter of practical necessity, (3) party holds himself
out as willing to perform service for any member of public, or at least
for any member within certain established standards, (4) as result of es-
sential nature of service party invoking exculpation possesses decisive
advantage of bargaining strength, (5) in exercising superior bargaining
power party confronts public with standardized adhesion contract of ex-
culpation, and makes no provision for purchaser to obtain protection
against negligence, and (6) as result of transaction, person or property of
purchaser is placed at risk of carelessness by seller or his agents .... 96
In general, these factors have led to the development of two special
safeguard rules of contract construction that have emerged in nearly all ju-
risdictions with respect to the validity and enforceability of exculpatory
clauses.97 First, because of their general disfavor of exculpatory clauses,
courts will nearly always strictly construe an exculpatory clause against the
party relying on it.98 Second, for the exculpatory clause to be considered
valid and enforceable, the release must conspicuously and clearly describe
the specific liability to be avoided.99 When evaluating exculpatory clauses,
the courts in many jurisdictions, apply these two "special" rules of contract
construction.100
94. Shell, supra note 5, at 525.
95. Id. at 526.
96. YMCA of Metro. L.A. v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 612, 614-15 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997); see also WILLISTON, supra note 38, at § 19:22.






D. History and Development of "Traditional" Attitudes Related to the
Enforcement of Exculpatory Clauses by the Arkansas Judiciary
In the earliest recorded case dealing with exculpatory clauses in Ar-
kansas, Gulf Compress Co. v. Harrington,'0' plaintiff Harrington sought
compensation for the loss of thirty-four bales of cotton that were destroyed
by fire while in storage at the defendant's facility.' °2 Gulf Compress alleged
that it was not responsible for the loss because it had contracted against li-
ability, even liability caused by its own negligence. 10 3 The exculpatory
clause stated that Gulf Compress was "[n]ot responsible for loss by fire, acts
of Providence, natural shrinkage, old damage, or for failure to note con-
cealed damage."' 4 Because the exculpatory clause did not specifically men-
tion liability for negligence, the primary question before the court was
whether the exemption included negligence.'05 The release language ap-
peared on a "receipt" prepared by Gulf and issued to Harrington.,0 6 In Gulf,
the Arkansas Supreme Court referred to a factually similar Colorado case,
Denver Public Warehouse Co. v. Munger,10 7 in which the Colorado Court of
Appeals held that a similar exculpatory clause was unenforceable and ob-
served that: "Contracts against liability for negligence are not favored by the
law. In some instances, such as common carriers, they are prohibited as
against public policy. In all cases such contracts should be construed
strictly, with every intendment against the party seeking their protection."
108
The Gulf court next sought guidance from the California case of
Dieterle v. Bekin.'0 9 In Dieterle, a warehouse's receipt stated that there
would be "[n]o liability for fire."110 The California court found, however,
that such an exculpatory clause could not negate the liability of the ware-
house for the exercise of ordinary care."' Borrowing from the principals
articulated in the Colorado and California cases, the Supreme Court of Ar-
kansas held in Gulf that, in accordance with the rules of contract interpreta-
tion, an exculpatory clause should be construed strictly against the party
relying on it. " 2 Further, even if public policy did not forbid enforcement of
101. 90 Ark. 256, 119 S.W. 249 (1909).
102. Id. at 257, 119 S.W. at 249.
103. Id. at 258, 119 S.W. at 249.
104. Id., 119 S.W. at 250.
105. Id., 119 S.W. at 250.
106. Id., 119 S.W. at250.
107. 77 P. 5 (Colo. Ct. App. 1904).
108. Id. at 5.
109. 77 P. 664 (Cal. 1904).
110. Id. at 665.
111. Id. at666.
112. Gulf, 90 Ark. at 259, 119 S.W. at 250.
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the contract, if the terms of the exculpatory clause were not clearly ex-
pressed, the exculpatory clause would be held unenforceable." 13 Thus, be-
cause of the exculpatory clause's lack of specificity, the court in Gulf
strictly construed the ambiguity against Gulf and held the clause unenforce-
able.
14
In 1942, in a similar bailment-warehouse case, Arkansas Power and
Light Co. v. Kerr,"5 the Arkansas Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous
ruling that liability related to ordinary care and negligence cannot be con-
tractually negated!116 When Kerr delivered and stored cases of eggs in Ar-
kansas Power and Light Company's (AP&L) ice cooler, AP&L provided a
receipt to Kerr containing an exculpatory clause that attempted in part to
relieve Kerr from liability for the condition of the eggs while they were in
storage."17 The court ruled that public policy required a party to exhibit
"caution and forethought" when handling the property of others and that the
exculpatory clause was not enforceable because the defendant "sought to
relieve itself from the consequences of its negligence."
' 8
Thirty years later in 1972, in yet another storage-bailment case, Mid-
dleton v. Cato,' 19 the court reiterated its two previously established primary
rules regarding liability negation: (1) contracts of this nature are not favored
and thus will be strictly construed against the party relying on them; and (2)
contracts of this nature will be enforced only if the limiting language clearly
and unambiguously sets out what liability is to be avoided.120 In Middleton,
the bailee sued to recover the value of over 18,000 pounds of spoiled meat
that it had stored in the bailor's frozen food locker.12' The bailor argued that
Middleton verbally agreed to assume all risk of damage to the meat and that
Middleton overloaded the refrigeration capacity of the locker by the manner
in which it stacked the bailor's meat in the locker. 22 The court noted that, in
this case, the contract between the parties was oral and did not clearly spec-
ify what risks were being assumed or negated. 123 The court emphasized,
however, that neither in Kerr, nor in Middleton, had it held that it is "impos-
113. Id., 119 S.W. at250.
114. Id., 119 S.W. at 250.
115. 204 Ark. 238, 161 S.W.2d 403 (1942).
116. Id. at 241, 161 S.W.2d at 404.
117. Id. at 239-40, 161 S.W.2d at 403-04.
118. Id. at241, 161 S.W.2d at 404.
119. 251 Ark. 745, 474 S.W.2d 895 (1972).
120. Id. at 749, 474 S.W. 2d at 897.
121. Id. at 746, 474 S.W.2d at 896.
122. Id. at 747, 474 S.W.2d at 896.
123. Id. at 750-51, 474 S.W.2d at 898. The exculpatory clause was not clear because
there were "many risks" associated with the storage of meat in the Defendant's freezer, and
the verbal contract did not explicitly specify which risks Defendant was attempting to negate.
Id. at 751, 474 S.W.2d at 898.
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sible to avoid liability for negligence through contract."'' 2 4 Rather, the court
clarified that to negate liability, the contract must clearly describe what li-
ability is to be avoided. 125 Although the Middleton court did not uphold the
exculpatory clause before it, Middleton was significant because it was the
first case in which the Arkansas Supreme Court expressly confirmed that,
when clearly and explicitly documented, an exculpatory clause could suc-
cessfully negate liability for negligence.
126
Arkansas law regarding exculpatory clauses was next tested in 1987 in
the federal district court case (decided under Arkansas law) of Williams v.
United States.2 7 In Williams, a teenage boy drowned while attending an
ROTC outing at an Air Force base pool. 28 The boy's father had signed a
"Student Data and Release form," which the Air Force contended released it
from all liability. 129 The Williams court noted that it had found no cases in
Arkansas "in which agreements purporting to release a party from liability
for his own negligence before it occurs have been upheld."' 130 Similar to the
nearly eighty years of previous Arkansas case law, the Williams court was
concerned that the contractual release of liability in advance of negligence
or damage would discourage the exercise of reasonable care.'
31
In Williams, the court applied the special rules of construction requir-
ing an exculpatory clause to specify clearly the liability being negated and
to be strictly construed against the party relying on it. 132 The court opined
that the Air Force's release form merely advised the parents of a child as to
the potential hazards of swimming and diving, not to the potential hazards
of Air Force negligence.133 The court observed that a parent's acceptance of
the inherent risk associated with the activity of swimming is quite different
from a parent's acceptance of the risk of harm from the Air Force's negli-
gence.134 Because of the ambiguity of the wording on the release form, the
124. Id. at 750, 474 S.W.2d at 898.
125. Middleton, 251 Ark. at 750, 474 S.W.2d at 898.
126. See id. at 750, 474 S.W.2d at 898.
127. 660 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Ark. 1987).
128. Id. at 701-02.
129. Id. at 702. The "Student Data and Release Form" reads in pertinent part as follows:
In the unlikely event that Don is injured while participating in one of these activities, I give
my consent for treatment at the U.S. Air Force Hospital at Little Rock Air Force Base and
release all agencies and departments of the United States government (Department of De-
fense and U.S. Air Force), Little Rock Air Force Base, and all members of the United States
Air Force and its civilian employees of any and all responsibility and/or liability for injury or
death that might occur.
Id. at 702.
130. Id. at 702.
131. Id. at 702-03.
132. Id. at 703.




court once again ruled that public policy rendered the exculpatory clause
unenforceable.'
35
In 1998, in a case involving partial liability limitation, Edgin v. En-
136tergy Operations Inc., a security guard who sustained injuries while on
duty sought damages contrary to the provisions of the exculpatory clause
contained in the employment agreement she had signed.137 The court noted
that historically, in employer-employee relationships, exculpatory clauses
exempting an employer for liability from negligence were forbidden. 3 8 In
this case, however, the exculpatory language contained in the employment
agreement excluded claims that were covered under workers' compensation
insurance. 139 The court distinguished Edgin from traditional exculpatory
clause cases in that the exculpatory clause in Edgin did not negate all negli-
gence claims, but rather, only those claims that were covered under work-
ers' compensation insurance. 140 Because the exculpatory clause limited only
otherwise insured claims (worker's compensation), Entergy was still
obliged to observe reasonable care. 14 1 Accordingly, the court determined
that the exculpatory clause contained in the employment agreement in
Edgin was not contrary to Arkansas public policy and upheld the partial
exculpation clause. 1
42
E. Development of "Changing" Attitudes Related to the Enforcement of
Exculpatory Clauses by the Arkansas Judiciary
Arkansas courts have migrated from a traditional policy of tending to
hold exculpatory clauses unenforceable as a matter of public policy to a




136. 331 Ark. 162, 961 S.W.2d 724 (1998).
137. Id. at 165, 961 S.W.2d at 725.
138. Id. at 167, 961 S.W.2d at 726; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
195(2)(a) (1981).
139. Edgin, 331 Ark. at 165, 961 S.W.2d at 725. The exculpatory clause is reproduced
below:
I HEREBY WAIVE AND FOREVER RELEASE ANY RIGHTS I MIGHT
HAVE to make claims or bring suit against any client or customer of Wackenhut
for damages based upon injuries which are covered under such Workers' Com-
pensation statutes.
Id. at 166, 961 S.W.2d at 725.
140. Id. at 167, 961 S.W.2d at 726.
141. Id. at 168, 961 S.W.2d at 727.
142. Id. at 167, 961 S.W.2d at 726.
143. See Haines v. St. Charles Speedway, Inc., 874 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1989); Williams v.
United States, 660 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Ark. 1987); Jordan v. Diamond Equip. & Supply Co.,
No. 04-1113, 2005 WL 984513 (Ark. Apr. 28, 2005); Finagin v. Ark. Dev. Fin. Auth., 355
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In July of 2001, the Arkansas Supreme Court enforced for the first
time a contract containing an exculpatory clause that completely avoided
liability for ordinary negligence. 144 In Plant v. Wilbur, the plaintiff was ex-
perienced in auto, racing and was a member of the "pit" crew of one of the
drivers at the racetrack. 145 In order to gain admission into the "pits" and
"infield" area, the plaintiff freely signed an exculpatory agreement that
clearly and comprehensively specified the liability that was to be negated.
146
Ark. 440, 139 S.W.3d 797 (2003); Plant v. Wilbur, 345 Ark. 487, 47 S.W.3d 889 (2001);
Edgin v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 331 Ark. 162, 961 S.W.2d 724 (1998); Farmers Bank v.
Perry, 301 Ark. 547, 787 S.W.2d 645 (1990); Middleton v. Cato, 251 Ark. 745, 474 S.W.2d
895 (1972); Ark. Power & Light Co. v. Kerr, 204 Ark. 238, 161 S.W.2d 403 (1942); Gulf
Compress Co. v. Harrington, 90 Ark. 256, 119 S.W. 249 (1909); Miller v. ProTransport., 78
Ark. App. 52, 77 S.W.3d 551 (2002).
144. Plant, 345 Ark. 487, 495, 47 S.W.3d 889, 894 (2001).
145. Id. at 495, 47 S.W.3d at 894.
146. Id. at 489, 47 S.W.3d at 890. The exculpatory clause is reproduced below:
IN CONSIDERATION' of being permitted to enter for any purpose any
RESTRICTED AREA (herein defined as including but not limited to the racing
surface, pit areas, infield, bum out area, approach area, shut down area, and all
walkways, concessions and other areas appurtenant to any area where any activ-
ity related to the event shall take place), or being permitted to compete, officiate,
observe, work for, or for any purpose participate in any way in the event, EACH
OF THE UNDERSIGNED, for himself, his personal representatives, heirs, and
next of kin, acknowledges, agrees and represents that he has, or will immediately
upon entering any of such restricted areas, and will continuously thereafter, in-
spect such restricted areas and all portions thereof which he enters and with
which he comes in contact, and he does further warrant that his entry upon such
restricted area or areas and his participation, if any, in the event constitutes an
acknowledgment that he has inspected such restricted area and that he finds and
accepts the same as being safe and reasonably suited for the purposes of his use,
and he further agrees and warrants that if, at any time, he is in or about restricted
areas and he feels anything to be unsafe, he will immediately advise the officials
of such and will leave the restricted areas:
1. HEREBY RELEASES, WAIVES, DISCHARGES AND COVENANTS
NOT TO SUE the promoter, participants, racing association, sanctioning organi-
zation or any subdivision thereof, track operator, track owner, officials, car own-
ers, drivers, pit crews, any persons in any restricted area, promoters, sponsors,
advertisers, owners and lessees of premises used to conduct the event and each
of them, their officers and employees, all for the purposes herein referred to as
"releasees", from all liability to the undersigned, his personal representatives, as-
signs, heirs, and next of kin for any and all loss or damage, and any claim or
demands therefor on account of injury to the person or property or resulting in
death of the undersigned, whether caused by the negligence of the releasees or
otherwise while the undersigned is in or upon the restricted area, and/or, compet-
ing, officiating in, observing, working for, or for any purpose participating in the
event.
2. HEREBY AGREES TO INDEMNIFY AND SAVE AND HOLD
HARMLESS the releasees and each of them from any loss, liability, damage, or
cost they may incur due to the presence of the undersigned in or upon the re-
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While in this otherwise restricted area, Plant was struck by a tire that be-
came detached from one of the racecars and suffered injuries. 147 The court
held that the exculpatory clause was conspicuous and comprehensive, and
specifically described the potential liability that was to be negated.' 48 The
court found that Plant had previously signed many other similar releases,
was a regular participant in the sport, and was familiar with the harm and
accidents that could occur in an inherently dangerous sport like auto rac-
ing. 149 The court found no evidence that Plant was coerced into signing the
release. 15 0 Furthermore, negligence of the "releasees" was specifically men-
tioned in the release, as well as a provision in which the plaintiff agreed to
immediately advise track officials of any perceived unsafe conditions and
then proceed to exit the restricted area.'51
The Plant court turned to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's
case of Haines v. St. Charles Speedway Inc.,' 52 a remarkably factually simi-
lar case, for guidance.153 In addition to the two special rules applicable to
exculpatory clauses (strict construction and clearly described liability to be
avoided), the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the "total transaction" ap-
proach utilized by the Haines court.1 54 Under the total transaction approach,
stricted area or in any way competing, officiating, observing, or working for, or
for any purpose participating in the event and whether caused by the negligence
of the releasees or otherwise.
3. HEREBY ASSUMES FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR AND RISK OF
BODILY INJURY, DEATH OR PROPERTY DAMAGE due to the negligence
of releasees or otherwise while in or upon the restricted area and/or while com-
peting, officiating, observing, or working for or for any purpose participating in
the event.
4. EACH OF THE UNDERSIGNED expressly acknowledges and agrees that
the activities of the event are very dangerous and involve the risk of serious in-
jury and/or death and/or property damage. EACH OF THE UNDERSIGNED
further expressly agrees that the foregoing release, waiver, and indemnity
agreement is intended to be as broad and inclusive as is permitted by the law of
the Province or State in which the event is conducted and that if any portion
thereof is held invalid, it is agreed that the balance shall, notwithstanding, con-
tinue in full legal force and effect.
5. THE UNDERSIGNED HAS READ AND VOLUNTARILY SIGNS THE
RELEASE AND WAIVER OF LIABILITY AND INDEMNITY
AGREEMENT, and further agrees that no oral representations, statements or in-
ducements apart from the foregoing written agreement have been made.
Id. at 490-91, 47 S.W.3d at 890-91.
147. Id. at 491, 47 S.W.3d at 891.
148. Id. at 495, 47 S.W.3d at 894.
149. Id. at 494-95, 47 S.W. 2d at 894.
150. Plant, 345 Ark. at 494-95, 47 S.W. 2d at 894.
151. Id. at 490, 495, 47 S.W.3d at 890-91, 894.
152. 874 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1989).
153. Plant, 345 Ark. at 493, 47 S.W.3d at 893.
154. Id. at 493-94, 47 S.W.3d at 893.
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the court comprehensively analyzed all the conditions and factors involved
in the transaction, not just the literal language of the agreement.'55 In hold-
ing the agreement enforceable, the Plant court focused on the plaintiffs
extensive familiarity and experience with the sport of auto racing as both a
spectator and a participant. 56 The court also distinguished Plant from pre-
vious exculpatory clause cases because it considered auto racing to be a
recreational activity affecting only a narrow segment of society, not a matter
involving general public interest.1 57 The Plant majority reasoned that volun-
tary participation in narrow recreational activities like auto racing does not
involve the general public, and therefore, such activities do not warrant pub-
lic policy concerns.1
58
There was, however, a two-judge dissent in Plant.59 The dissent ex-
pressed concern over two factors: (1) whether the release was sufficiently
clear and specific to make the plaintiff aware of the liability that he was
releasing, and (2) whether differentiating sporting events such as an auto
race, hockey game, or wrestling match from other general public activities
promotes reasonable standards of care and prudent public policy. 60 A sig-
nificant point of disagreement in Plant was whether an auto racing event
should be classified as a narrow, private activity or as an activity affecting
the general public.16' Writing for the dissent, Justice Glaze stated: "We
should not, in my opinion, allow parties who promote dangerous sports ac-
tivities to be effectively immunized from liability when a spectator is in-
jured ... because the party promoting the dangerous sport failed to afford the
spectator, as an invitee, a reasonably safe environment.,
162
Thus, Plant initiated a debate, which would be revisited in later Arkan-
sas exculpatory clause cases as to what constitutes a private versus public
activity.
161
In 2002, the Arkansas Court of Appeals decided Miller v. Pro-
Transportation, 64 another case differentiated by the Arkansas courts by a
similar private versus public activity analysis. 65 In Miller, a truck driver
sought permission from the company to have his wife ride with him in the
company vehicle during his delivery hauls.' 66 Pro-Transportation permitted
155. Id. at 494, 47 S.W.3d at 893.
156. Id. at 494-95, 47 S.W.3d at 894.
157. Id. at 494, 47 S.W.3d at 893.
158. Id., 47 S.W.3d at 893.
159. Plant, 345 Ark. at 496-500, 47 S.W.3d at 895-97 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 499, 47 S.W.3d at 897 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
161. See id., 47 S.W.3d at 897 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 499, 47 S.W.3d at 897 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
163. See generally id. at 499, 47 S.W.3d at 897 (Glaze, J., dissenting)(emphasis added).
164. 78 Ark. App. 52, 77 S.W.3d 551 (2002).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 53, 77 S.W.3d at 552.
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Mrs. Miller to ride in the company vehicles in exchange for her signing an
exculpatory agreement that provided that she would hold Pro-
Transportation harmless from any liability for any injury received while
riding in the vehicle. 167 After the Millers were involved in an accident, Mrs.
Miller sued Pro-Transportation alleging that her husband's negligence
caused the accident, and that the exculpatory agreement was invalid because
it did not clearly set out what liability was to be avoided. 168 The court of
appeals disagreed and found the agreement to be enforceable because the
language "clearly and specifically sets out the negligent liability to be
avoided, i.e., liability for any injuries that the applicant may suffer while
riding as a passenger in appellee's motor vehicle."'
169
Furthermore, the court applied the total transaction approach as estab-
lished in the earlier case of Plant.170 Under this approach, the fact that Mrs.
Miller had signed agreements permitting her to ride in the vehicle with her
husband with at least three previous employers convinced the court that she
was very familiar with the risks and dangers associated with commercial
trucking.171 The clarity and specificity of the agreement, as well as the cir-
cumstances that indicated that Mrs. Miller was knowledgeable of the risks
and dangers associated with commercial trucking, and the fact that Mr.
Miller had every reason to drive carefully (because his wife was in the vehi-
cle), convinced the court that no potential public policy or safety concerns
existed. 172 In essence, the court held that not only did the exculpatory clause
clearly specify what liability was to be avoided, but also that the Millers'
situation was a narrow, private matter, and not a matter of public policy or
safety.
173
In 2003, the Arkansas Supreme Court again evaluated the validity and
enforceability of exculpatory clauses in Finagin v. Arkansas Development
Finance Authority (ADFA). 174 In Finagin, in order to obtain financing, a
group of investors executed personal guarantees that included an exculpa-
167. Id. at 53-54, 77 S.W.3d at 552. The exculpatory clause is reproduced below:
In consideration of my being permitted to ride as a passenger in a motor vehicle
leased or owned by ProTransportation, Inc., I will hold ProTransportation harm-
less from any liability for any damage or injury which I may receive [sic] while
riding in said motor vehicle both as to any right of action that may accrue to my-
self and to my heirs and personal representatives.
Id. at 55, 77 S.W.3d at 553.
168. Id. at 54-55, 77 S.W.3d at 553.
169. Id. at 55, 77 S.W.3d at 553-54.
170. Miller, 78 Ark. App. at 55, 77 S.W.3d at 554; see also Plant, 345 Ark. at 494, 47
S.W.3d at 893.
171. Miller, 78 Ark. App. at 55-56, 77 S.W.3d at 554.
172. Id., 77 S.W.3d at 554.
173. Id. at 56, 77 S.W.3d at 554.
174. 355 Ark. 440, 139 S.W.3d 797 (2003).
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tory clause.1 75 After the project defaulted on its note, the investors brought
an action against ADFA alleging, inter alia, that ADFA had not adequately
protected the collateral.1 76 ADFA relied on the validity and enforceability of
the exculpatory clause, while the investors argued that the exculpatory
clause was too broad and against public policy. 177 The exculpatory clause
provided that no set off, counterclaim, or defense of any kind would be
available to the guarantors-investors against ADFA.178 After reviewing and
endorsing the history and development of exculpatory clauses in Arkansas,
the Finagin court developed a refinement to the then existing rules of law
applicable to exculpatory clauses. 179 Drawing primarily from the holdings in
Plant and its predecessors and from public policy factors, the court essen-
tially integrated the two traditional "special rules" of contract construction
with the factual "total transaction" approach and established the Finigan
"factors" for evaluating the validity and enforceability of exculpatory
clauses. 80 The court noted that the previous Arkansas cases established the
principle that "an exculpatory clause may be enforced: (1) when the party is
knowledgeable of the potential liability that is released; (2) when the party
is benefiting from the activity which may lead to the potential liability that
is released; and (3) when the contract that contains the clause was fairly
entered into."'18 The Finagin court emphasized the importance of evaluat-
ing the total factual circumstances concurrently with the agreement when
determining whether each of the "factors" had been met. 82 In upholding the
enforceability of the exculpatory clause in Finigan, the court noted that the
parties to the transaction were sophisticated businesspersons, that the trans-
action was conducted at arm's length, and that the investors were knowl-
edgeable of the fact that they were waiving potential defenses.
83
It should be noted that before Jordan, the cases in which Arkansas
courts have held exculpatory clauses enforceable can be differentiated by
either: (1) the association of those clauses with some form of private or nar-
row activity that did not affect the general public or overall public policy, or
175. Id. at 445, 455, 139 S.W.3d at 799-800, 806.
176. Id. at 453-54, 139 S.W.3d at 805.
177. Id. at 455, 139 S.W.3d at 806. In relevant part, the exculpatory clause reads as fol-
lows: "No setoff, counterclaim, reduction, diminution of an obligation, or any defense of any
kind or nature which the guarantor [appellants] has or may have against the authority
[ADFA] or the trustee shall be available hereunder to the guarantor against the authority."
Id., 139 S.W.3d at 806.
178. Id., 139 S.W.3d at 806.
179. Id. at 455-58, 139 S.W.3dat 806-08.
180. See Finagin, 355 Ark. at 455-58, 139 S.W.3d at 806-08.
181. Id. at458, 139 S.W.3d at 808.
182. See Id.
183. Id., 139 S.W.3d at 808.
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(2) the fact that the exculpatory clause only partially exempted liability.'8 4
Specifically, in Plant, the court held that recreational auto racing involved
only a narrow segment of the public; 85 in Finagin, the court held that the
exculpatory clause limited only liability from "setoff, counterclaim, reduc-
tion, diminution of an obligation.. . ," not a release from all liability; 186 and
in Miller, that court opined that because Mr. Miller had every reason to
drive safely (Mrs. Miller was riding in the vehicle), the circumstances were
narrow and did not constitute a safety or public policy concern. 187 Another
common fact in these cases is that the parties, against whom the exculpatory
clauses were enforced, were voluntarily assuming a well-known risk.
188
With this history in mind, the stage is set for an analysis of a case that does
not present a special or narrow circumstance, or a limited exculpation of
liability, but instead involves a routine transaction between a business and a
member of the general public.189 It is within this setting that we examine the
case of Jordan v. Diamond Equipment and Supply Corp.190
IV. REASONING
In Jordan, the Arkansas Supreme Court, in a four-to-three decision, af-
firmed the trial court's summary judgment that Diamond Equipment's lease
agreement contained an exculpatory clause that was valid and enforce-
able.' 9' After reviewing and endorsing the development of the rules of law
used to evaluate the validity and enforceability of exculpatory clauses in
Arkansas, the majority held that the exculpatory language effectively re-
leased Diamond from liability from any injuries due to "neglect, mechanical
failure, or any cause whatsoever., 192 Conversely, in a spirited dissent, the
minority argued that the majority "radically deviate[d]" from the cautious
approach traditionally used by the court to prevent the erosion of reasonable
care. 1
93
184. Brief for Petitioner at 127-30, Jordan v. Diamond Equip. & Supply Co., No. 04-
1113, 2005 WL 984513 (Ark. Apr. 28, 2005).
185. Jordan, 2005 WL 984513, at *3; see also Plant, 345 Ark. at 494,47 S.W. 3d at 893.
186. Jordan, 2005 WL 984513, at *7 (Imber, J., dissenting); see also Finagin, 355 Ark.
at 455, 139 S.W.3d at 806.
187. Jordan, 2005 WL 984513 at *7 (Imber, J., dissenting); see also Miller, 78 Ark. App.
at 56, 77 S.W.3d at 554.
188. Joint Appendix at 127-30, Jordan (No. 04-1113).
189. Id.
190. No. 04-1113, 2005 WL 984513 (Ark. Apr. 28, 2005).
191. Jordan, 2005 WL 984513, at *6.
192. Id.
193. Id. at *8 (Imber, J., dissenting).
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A. The Court Reviews the Enforcement of Exculpatory Clauses in Arkan-
sas
The court began by reviewing the history and development of the en-
forcement of exculpatory clauses in Arkansas. 194 The court reiterated the
long-recognized Arkansas maxim that exculpatory clauses that exempt a
party from liability for negligence are not favored by the law because of the
strong public policy of encouraging the exercise of reasonable care. 195 The
court noted that Arkansas law requires the application of two special rules
of contract construction when evaluating the validity and enforceability of
an exculpatory clause. 96 First, exculpatory clauses are strictly construed
against the party relying on them, and second, the clauses must clearly set
out what liability is to be avoided.1 97 In addition to the two special rules of
contract construction, the court also reviewed the supplemental "factors" to
be considered when evaluating an exculpatory clause that were set forth in
Finagin:198 (1) a party must be knowledgeable of the potential liability they
are releasing; (2) the party must benefit from the activity surrounding the
transaction; and, (3) the contract must be fairly entered into. 99 The court
further noted that, when evaluating contracts that contain exculpatory
clauses, it would consider all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
agreement, not just the literal language of the contract. °0
194. See Jordan, 2005 WL 984513, at *2-3.
195. Id. at *3.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at *2-3.
199. Id. at *3.
200. Jordan, 2005 WL 984513, at *2.
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B. The Majority Finds the Exculpatory Clause Valid
Turning to the specific agreement between Jordan and Diamond,2 °1 the
majority, primarily relying on the precedents set forth in Edgin20 2 and
Plant,20 3 determined that the release language was clear and unambigu-
ous.20 4 The majority found that the language of the exculpatory clause
which stated that Diamond is not liable for damages sustained from "ne-
glect, mechanical failure, or any cause whatsoever" was sufficient to satisfy
the special rule of contract construction requiring specificity of the liability
to be avoided. 20 5 Furthermore, the majority opined that all three Finigan
factors were satisfied in Jordan.20 6 First, because the front of the document
contained a provision that said, "Customer has received complete safety
instructions," as well as another provision which stated, "See Damage
Waiver on Reverse Side. I hereby accept the damage waiver," the majority
concluded that Jordan must have been knowledgeable of the potential liabil-
ity that he was releasing because he signed and initialed the contract.
20 7
Second, because Jordan utilized the equipment to perform a landscaping job
related to his business, the court found that the requirement that a party
must benefit from the transaction was fulfilled.20 8 Third, because the court
found no evidence of "fraud, duress, undue influence, lack of capacity, mu-
tual mistake, or inequitable conduct sufficient to void the contract," it held
that the last of the Finigan factors, which requires a party to have freely
201. Reproduced below in relevant part is the section found on the reverse side of the
rental agreement entitled "Warranties and Liability" that contained the exculpatory clause:
Diamond Equipment Rental and Supply, Inc. is not responsible for injuries or damages sus-
tained in the use of these items whether the damages are due to neglect, mechanical failure,
or any other cause whatsoever, regardless of who happens to be operating the equipment.
The lessee assumes full liability from the time the equipment is rented until it is returned.
The lessee accepts the items in the "as is" condition and does hereby absolve and relieve
lessors from any liability by reason of or resulting from the condition of the rented items.
Lessee binds and obligates himself to hold lessors free and harmless from any and all liabil-
ity from any claims of third persons in connection with or arising out of the condition or use
of the rented items. Any repairs made to items listed in this contract by anyone other than a
lessor or its employee shall be the sole responsibility of the lessee, unless written authority
for said repairs is granted by Diamond Equipment Rental and Supply, Inc.
Id. at *3-4.
202. 331 Ark. 162, 961 S.W.2d 724 (1998).
203. 345 Ark. 487, 47 S.W.3d 889 (2001).
204. Jordan, 2005 WL 984513, at *4.
205. Id. The first special rule of contract construction requiring that the party relying on
the exculpatory clause must clearly specify what liability is to be avoided. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. The majority twice referred to the rule that a person is presumed to know the




entered into the contract, was also satisfied.20 9 Furthermore, Jordan's appar-
ent failure to attempt to modify the agreement affirmed the majority's con-
clusion that the contract was freely entered into and was not a contract of
adhesion. l° In sum, the majority concluded that the language of the excul-
patory clause contained in the contract was written in clear and concise
terms, was not "inordinately long" or complex, and was executed only after
the parties exchanged mutual discussion and training.211 The majority
opined that, when strictly construed against Diamond, the exculpatory
clause clearly set out what negligence was to be avoided and was not
against public policy; therefore, it also complied with the second special
212rule of contract construction. For these reasons, the Jordan court held that
the exculpatory clause contained within the contract was valid and enforce-
able.213
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Writing for the dissent, Justice Imber stated that the majority opinion
did not correctly apply Arkansas precedent, "and is founded on a misinter-
pretation of the challenged exculpatory clause and a misapplication of the
law., 2 14 Specifically, Justice Imber distinguished Plant, which was cited by
the majority as one of the precedents for its decision, from the case at bar.
215
Justice Imber noted that the court in Plant placed significant emphasis on
the fact that Plant was very experienced in the sport of autoracing, as com-
pared to Jordan, who apparently had not operated a Bobcat before the day of
the accident.216 Furthermore, the dissent focused on the fact that a fairly
limited segment of the public is involved with auto racing, while the seg-
ment of the public that could be exposed to exculpatory clauses while rent-
ing equipment is limitless.217 The dissent emphasized that when exculpatory
clauses evolve from narrow applications into the daily activities of the gen-
eral population, the enforcement of these exculpatory clauses "would have
sweeping consequences for every future rental agreement in all areas of
daily life. 2 8 According to Justice Imber, Plant is also easily distinguish-
able from Jordan because auto racing is purely recreational, while renting
209. Id.
210. See Jordan, 2005 WL 984513, at *4.
211. Id.
212. Id. The second special rule of contract construction requires strict construction
against the party relying on the exculpatory clause. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at *7 (Imber, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at *7-8 (Imber, J., dissenting).
216. See Jordan, 2005 WL 984513, at *8 (Imber, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at *8 (Imber, J., dissenting).
218. Id. (Imber, J., dissenting).
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equipment in the pursuit of earning a living is not.219 While a large percent-
age of the public may participate in recreational activities, nearly everyone
participates in earning a living in some fashion.2 °
With regard to public policy, the dissent contrasted the motivations of
the defendants in Edgin221 and Miller222 with the motivation of the defen-
dant in Jordan.223 Because their liability was only partially limited by the
exculpatory clauses in Edgin and Miller, the defendants still had consider-
able motivation to exercise reasonable care.224 Conversely, according to the
minority's interpretation in Jordan, the defendant had seemingly little moti-
vation to "maintain its machinery and business in a way that reduces the risk
of harm to others., 225 Justice Imber suggested that this situation encouraged
lack of care because Diamond could now operate without fear of financial
or legal repercussions from its negligence.226 Thus, the dissent opined that
the majority's treatment of the exculpatory clause in Jordan deviated from
the caution and disfavor with which Arkansas law had traditionally treated
exculpatory clauses.227
The dissent argued that the majority echoed the traditional notions of
strict construction and disfavor, but never actually performed any analysis
that explained the precise scope of the exculpatory clause.228 Unlike the
majority, the dissent believed the exculpatory clause was ambiguous.
229
According to Justice Imber, the majority opinion never actually answered
the specific question of "who is released and from what liability," and in-
stead it only "quote[d] the vague and inconclusive language of the clause, as
if its meaning will become clear with repetition., 230 The dissent also stated
that, because the majority's opinion provided no specific explanation of the
scope or meaning of the exculpatory clause, the clause could not meet the
special rule of contract construction requiring that an exculpatory clause
clearly and specifically set out the liability that is to be avoided.23'
Further, the dissent suggested that the first Finigan factor that requires
a party to be knowledgeable of the potential liability that he is releasing,
219. Id. (Imber, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at *8 (Imber, J., dissenting).
221. 331 Ark. 162, 961 S.W.2d 724 (1998).
222. 78 Ark. App. 52, 77 S.W.3d 551 (2002).
223. Jordan, 2005 WL 984513, at *8 (Imber, J., dissenting).
224. Id. (Imber, J., dissenting).
225. Id. (Imber, J., dissenting).
226. Id. (Imber, J., dissenting).
227. Id. (Imber, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at *8-9 (Imber, J., dissenting).
229. Jordan, 2005 WL 984513, at *9 (Imber, J., dissenting).
230. Id. (Imber, J., dissenting).
231. Id. (Imber, J., dissenting).
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likewise had not been satisfied.232 Justice Imber fundamentally disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that Jordan's signature on the rental contract,
without more, was adequate to prove that he possessed the knowledge and
understanding necessary to validly release Diamond from liability. 23 3 The
dissent argued that, before the court could hold that Jordan possessed the
requisite knowledge to release liability, evidence demonstrating that he had
had an opportunity to thoroughly read and comprehend the exculpatory
clause was necessary.234
In summary, the dissent argued that the majority opinion provided no
clarity or explanation as to the scope or enforceability of the exculpatory
clause, indorsed broad and general terms instead of specifically analyzing
the language of the clause, and erroneously interpreted the limited evidence
to hold that the rules of law pertaining to exculpatory clauses had been
met.235 The dissent was gravely concerned that henceforth, exculpatory
clauses will not be disfavored or strictly construed against the parties rely-
ing on them, but rather, such clauses will be used as a vehicle to remove all




The principal question raised by the Jordan decision is whether the
Arkansas Supreme Court has abandoned the public policy limitations on
exculpatory clauses that Arkansas courts have traditionally recognized. 237 If
a party may limit virtually all liability and responsibility for injury arising
out of its negligent conduct in an ordinary contract (lease transaction), the
laws of torts only apply reliably to parties who are contractual strangers to
one other.238 If the validity and enforcement of exculpatory clauses now
turns only upon the principles of contract construction, both "the protection
of the law of torts, and the public policy imbued therein, [are] wholly subju-
gated to the pen of the scrivener. ''239 At a minimum, if Arkansas courts in-
terpret Jordan according to the majority's apparent intent, exculpatory
clauses will no longer be disfavored. 4 °
232. Id. at *10 (Imber, J., dissenting).
233. Id. (Imber, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at *10 (Imber, J., dissenting).
235. Jordan, 2005 WL 984513, at *10 (Imber, J., dissenting).
236. See id. (Imber, J., dissenting).
237. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 4, Jordan v. Diamond Equipment & Supply
Co., 2005 WL 984513 (Ark. Apr. 28, 2005)(No. 04-1113).
238. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at *4, Jordan (No. 04-1113).
239. Id. at *5.
240. Jordan, 2005 WL 984513, at *10 (Imber, J., dissenting).
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A. The Significance of Jordan to Claims of Negligence
The significance of the Jordan decision begins with a review of the
evidence as presented and argued by the plaintiff. In Jordan, no evidence
was presented to the court to show either that: (1) Jordan had previously
operated a Bobcat; (2) he had been instructed on the use of the Bobcat on an
inclined surface; or (3) he was aware of the magnitude of the weight distri-
bution shift of the Bobcat when material was dumped from the bucket.24'
Furthermore, Jordan did not come to Diamond to rent the Bobcat loader
specifically; to the contrary, he came to Diamond to receive advice about
the appropriate piece of equipment to rent.242 He subsequently received and
relied upon this advice.243 Jordan's rental was for a single job that was to be
completed within one day.244 Diamond is in the business of renting tools
and equipment to the public and obviously possesses knowledge that is su-
perior to the knowledge of the public, including members of the public who
rent tools or equipment in the pursuit of their own businesses. 45 Jordan's
rental of the Bobcat to facilitate the completion of a landscaping job related
to his business, but this does not suggest that Jordan was a sophisticated
businessperson or a competent and experienced Bobcat operator.246 The
transaction between Jordan and Diamond is similar to rental transactions
into which most members of the public enter at one time or another. No
material difference exists between Jordan's rental of the Bobcat and a rou-
tine consumer rental of a car, boat, trailer, recreational vehicle, carpet-
cleaning machine, pressure washer, or sporting equipment. In each of these
instances, a person with inferior knowledge will be renting from a person
with superior knowledge.
Moreover, Diamond did not present any evidence tending to prove: (1)
that any discussion took place between the parties specifically relating to the
terms and meaning of the exculpatory clause, (2) that the exculpatory clause
was "prominent" within the contract, or (3) that Jordan possessed any "ac-
tual knowledge" of the provisions of the exculpatory clause.24 7 The majority
simply relied on the fact that Jordan signed the contract and initialed the
provision indicating that he had received safety instructions and had ac-
cepted the damage waiver, the language for which, is all located on the front
of the rental agreement and unrelated to the exculpatory provisions located
241. See Joint Appendix at 6, Jordan (No. 04-1113).




246. Jordan, 2005 WL 984513, at *10 (Imber, J., dissenting).
247. See id. at *9.
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on the reverse side in a section entitled "Warranties and Liability. '24 Al-
though it is appropriate to hold parties accountable for the contents and
meaning of the documents they sign; 24 9 traditionally, the laws pertaining to
exculpatory clauses have required that parties possess actual, rather than
imputed, knowledge of the liability they are releasing.250 The majority ap-
parently regarded Jordan's signing of the contract as establishing that he had
the necessary knowledge and comprehension of the provisions of the excul-
patory clause. 5
According to the dissent, Jordan's testimony during his deposition con-
tained enough uncertainty regarding his knowledge of the liability that he
was releasing to raise the genuine question of fact necessary for the court to
deny Diamond's motion for summary judgment and send the case to a jury
to determine the facts consistent with the Finagin "factors" and the "totality
of the transaction" approach.252 The actual exculpatory language in the
"Warranties and Liability" section is not particularly prominent; Jordan
would have most likely had to read the entire reverse side of the rental
agreement to be aware of (much less comprehend) the liability that he was
releasing. 3
Furthermore, the majority cited Jordan's approval of the damage
waiver as proof of his acceptance of the exculpatory clause.254 Jordan
checked the box on the front of the rental contract accepting the damage
waiver and agreeing to pay $11.20 in additional fees for the coverage pro-
vided by the damage waiver. 255 Jordan's purchase of the damage waiver
248. Id. (Imber, J., dissenting).
249. Carmichael v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 305 Ark. 549, 552, 810 S.W.2d 39, 41
(1991).
250. See Jordan, 2005 WL 984513, at *10 (Imber, J., dissenting).
251. Id. (Imber, J., dissenting).
252. Id. (Imber, J., dissenting).
253. See generally Joint Appendix at 92-93, Jordan (No. 04-1113).
254. Jordan, 2005 WL 984513, at *4.
255. See generally Joint Appendix at 92, Jordan (No. 04-1113). Although Jordan most
likely perceived that by accepting the damage waiver and paying the additional rental
amount he was buying "insurance" coverage against accidental damage to the Bobcat, the
reverse side of the agreement contained four exceptions to the "limited damage waiver" that
virtually exempted most accidents that could have occurred during a one day rental, thereby
negating the effectiveness and perceived benefit of the damage waiver. The Limited Damage
Waiver reads as follows:
If customer has agreed to purchase limited damage waiver, and takes all reason-
able precautions to safeguard rented items and uses them in a safe and responsi-
ble manner, Diamond Equipment assumes the risk of direct physical loss or
damage due to accidental damage to rental equipment except in the following
circumstances:
1. Loss, damage or failure of tires and tubes under any circumstances.
2. If equipment is overloaded, operated above the rated capacity, rolled over,
or if operating and safety instructions are not followed.
[Vol. 28
CONTRACT LAW
does not support a presumption of a knowing acceptance of the exculpatory
clause and a release of Diamond from all liability for negligence.256 Rather,
Jordan's purchase of the damage waiver would support the contrary find-
ing-that he sought protection from risk of loss and damage, not that he
knowingly released Diamond from all loss that was caused by its own neg-
ligence.
B. The Significance of Jordan to Claims of Strict Products Liability
Jordan did not allege an actual product defect with the Bobcat; rather,
he alleged various counts of "failure to warn" based only on the negligence
of Diamond.257 Because Jordan pled his "failure to warn" claims against
Diamond under negligence principles, the Arkansas Supreme Court did not
consider the enforceability of the exculpatory clause under principles of
strict liability.
258
In Arkansas, when a duty to warn exists, a "failure to warn" is also ac-
tionable as a species of strict liability.259 Specifically, Arkansas law pro-
vides that, in order to state a cause of action under strict liability, a plaintiff
must plead:
3. If customer fails to contact Diamond Equipment regarding maintenance
and servicing of equipment, including but without limitation, lubrication, change
of filters when required, and maintenance of adequate air, oil, water, or fuel
pressures or levels.
4. If damage results from improper or unsafe operation or care whether
caused by negligence, lack of training, incompetence, or infidelity of the cus-
tomer's employee or other person to whom rented items are entrusted. Damage
waiver does not cover theft of equipment while in renter's possession.
Id. at 92.
256. See Jordan, 2005 WL 984513 at *10 (Imber, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at * 1. Initially, Jordan included Clark Equipment, the manufacturer of the Bob-
cat, as a separate defendant in his action; however, Jordan settled with Clark Equipment and
subsequently dismissed it from the action on May 14, 2005 (approximately two weeks after
the action was filed). Id. at * 1-2.
258. Jordan, 2005 WL 984513, at *1.
259. West v. Searle & Co., et al. 305 Ark. 33, 37, 806 S.W.2d 608, 610 (1991) ("As a
general rule, a manufacturer [and his agents] has a duty to warn the ultimate user of the risks
of its product. This duty exists under either the negligence or strict liability theories."); see
also ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-116-101 to -107 (Michie 1987) ("Arkansas Product Liability
Act of 1979"). For more discussion on Arkansas cases that have applied "failure to warn" as
a strict liability see DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, 697 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1983) (apply-
ing Arkansas law); French v. Grove Mfg. Co., 656 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying Ar-
kansas law); Parker v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 573 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1978) (applying
Arkansas law); Gisriel v. Uniroyal, Inc., 517 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1975) (applying Arkansas
law); Boemer v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (E.D. Ark. 1999);
Lee v. Martin, 74 Ark. App. 193, 45 S.W.3d 860 (2001); Hergeth, Inc. v. Green, 293 Ark.
119, 733 S.W.2d 409 (1987); Forrest City Machine Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 273 Ark. 33,
616 S.W.2d 720 (1981).
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(1) that he has sustained damages; (2) that the defendant was engaged in
the business of manufacturing, or assembling, or selling, or leasing, or
distributing the product; (3) that the product was supplied by the defen-
dant in a defective condition which rendered it unreasonably dangerous;
and (4) that the defective condition was a proximate cause of plaintiffs
damages.
260
Thus, Arkansas and many other jurisdictions have held that "the same
policy objectives that are served by holding commercial product sellers
strictly liable also apply to commercial product lessors. 2 61
With the increased use of leasing as a short-term convenience and al-
ternative to purchasing, it is not clear in states that have extended strict li-
ability to lessors:
to what extent, if any, the operation of the strict tort liability doctrine can
be avoided by the lease agreement [exculpatory clause] ... there is au-
thority to the effect that case law defining liability of a [lessor] to a third
person loses its force to the extent that such law is inconsistent with the
260. West, 305 Ark. at 37, 806 S.W.2d at 610 (citing ARK. CODEANN. §§ 16-116-101 to -
107 (Michie 1987)). In Arkansas, a product defect is defined as either a manufacturing de-
fect, a design defect, or an inadequate warning. Id.
261. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-116-101 to -107 (Michie 1987); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY: DEFINITION OF ONE WHO SELLS OR OTHERWISE
DISTRIBUTES § 20(b) (1998). During the formative years of products liability law, courts
focused primarily on extending strict liability to sales transactions. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 20(b). After the promulgation of § 402 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts (the predecessor to section 20(b) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability), the courts began to expand strict liability for harm caused by products
that were involved in non-traditional sales transactions such as rentals, leases, or promotional
give-aways. Id. According to the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability section
20(b):
[o]ne otherwise distributes a product when, in a commercial transaction other
than a sale, one provides the product to another either for use or consumption or
as a preliminary step leading to ultimate use or consumption. Commercial non-
sale product distributors include, but are not limited to, lessors, bailors, and
those who provide products to others as a means of promoting either the use or
consumption of such products or some other commercial activity.
Id. Particularly in lease transactions, an argument can be made that an even greater reason for
extending strict product liability to lessors may be that: (1) lessees are less apt to possess the
necessary knowledge and skill to conduct a thorough inspection of the rental equipment; and
(2) lessees may be prone to forgo the inspection of the rental equipment because they (per-
haps naively) believe that commercial lessors (being knowledgeable of the maintenance
requirements and operating parameters of the equipment in their rental inventory) have en-
sured that the equipment has been maintained properly and is currently operating correctly.
Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Products Liability: Application of Strict Liability in Tort Doc-
trine to Lessor of Personal Property, 52 A.L.R.3d 121 § 2(a) (2004).
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doctrine imposing strict liability for injury caused by a defect [failure to
warn] in a leased product.
262
Noting that Arkansas, and several states bordering Arkansas (Louisiana,
Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas),263 are among those having
held previously that strict product liability may be extended to lessors,2 6
Arkansas practitioners should carefully consider the potential validity and
enforceability of exculpatory clauses when asserted as a defense against a
claim of strict products liability. The policy considerations inherent in strict
262. Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Products Liability: Application of Strict Liability in
Tort Doctrine to Lessor of Personal Property, 52 A.L.R.3d 121 § 2(b) (2004).
263. The strict products liability laws (particularly pertaining to lessors) of these states
may be of specific interest to Arkansas practitioners who have clients with operations located
in these bordering states for which they wish to limit potential liability through the use of an
exculpatory clause.
264. Korpela, supra note 261, at § 3; "In the following products liability cases it has been
held that the strict tort liability doctrine is applicable not only to sellers and manufacturers of
defective products but also to persons engaged in the business of leasing chattels." The fol-
lowing cases are cited: Alaska-Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (1970);
California-Price v. Shell Oil Co., 466 P.2d 722 (Cal. 1970); Martinez v. Nichols Conveyor
& Engineering Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966); McClaflin v. Bayshore Equip-
ment Rental Co., 79 Cal. Rptr. 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); Fakhoury v. Magner, 101 Cal. Rptr.
473 (Cal. Ct. App.1972); Colordo-Baird v. Power Rental Equipment, Inc., 533 P.2d 941
(Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Delaware-Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581 (Del.
1976); Florida-Futch v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 391 So.2d 808 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
Hawaii-Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 470 P.2d 240 (Haw. Ct. App. 1970); Illi-
nois--Galluccio v. Hertz Corp., 274 N.E.2d 178 (I1l. App. Ct.1971), overruled by Saieva v.
Budget Rent-A-Car, 591 N.E.2d 507 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Profilet v. Falconite, 371 N.E.2d
1069 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Indiana--Gilbert v. Stone City Constr. Co., 357 N.E.2d 738 (Ind.
App. 1976)(superseded by statute); Louisiana--Cardwell v. Jefferson Rentals, 379 So. 2d
255 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Missouri-Wright v. Newman, 735 F.2d 1073 (8th. Cir. 1984)
(applying Missouri law); Nebraska-Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 209 N.W.2d 643
(Neb. 1973), overruled by Nat'l Crane Corp. v. Matthews, Co., 332 N.W.2d 39 (Neb. 1983);
New Jersey--Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769 (N.J. 1965);
Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc., 251 A.2d 278 (N.J. 1969); A-Leet Leasing Corp. v.
Kingshead Corp., 375 A.2d 1208 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977); New Mexico-Stang v.
Hertz Corp., 497 P.2d 732 (N.M. 1972); Rudisaile v. Hawk Aviation, Inc., 592 P.2d 175
(N.M.1979); New York-Waters v. Patent Scaffold Co., 427 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. App.
Div.1980); Samaras v. Gatx Leasing Corp., 428 N.Y.S.2d 48 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); Okla-
homa-Dewberry v. La Follette, 598 P.2d 241(Okla. 1979); Coleman v. Hertz Corp., 534
P.2d 940 (Okla. Civ. App. 1975); Oregon-Fulbright v. Klamath Gas Co., 533 P.2d 316 (Or.
1975); Pennsylvania-Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 372 A.2d 736 (Pa. 1977); Nath v.
Nat'l Equip. Leasing Corp. 373 A.2d 1105 (Pa. 1977); Mandel v. Gulf Leasing Corp., 378
A.2d 487 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977); Texas-Exxon Corp. v. Butler Drilling Co., 508 S.W.2d 901
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Rourke v. Garza, 511 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Wiscon-
sin--George v. Tonjes, 414 F. Supp. 1199 (W.D. Wis. 1976) (applying Wisconsin law)
(Lessor is subject to strict liability because its position in overall production and marketing
enterprise is no different from that of seller, and because lessor is as capable as seller of
preventing defective product from proceeding through stream of commerce). Id.
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products liability (as opposed to negligence) may dictate an entirely differ-
ent outcome when an exculpatory clause is raised as a defense to a strict
products liability claim.
VI. CONCLUSION
If, by the mere act of signing an agreement, knowledge may be im-
puted to the signer without thorough consideration of specific evidence (in
light of the totality of the transaction) indicating that the signer possessed
actual knowledge and understanding of the contents of that agreement, ex-
culpatory clauses are no longer less favored than other contract terms.
265
The effect could be profound in that providers of services in Arkansas will
perceive Jordan to be a blanket approval of exculpatory clauses in routine
transactions. 66 By applying the rules of law (related to the validity and en-
forcement of exculpatory clauses) resulting from the Jordan decision to
other service providers, it is easy to conceive contractual transactions in
which accountants, doctors, bankers, architects, or contractors exempt
themselves from all potential tort liability, including liability for negligence,
stemming from the performance of their services. 267 If Jordan is applied to
enforce exculpatory clauses against unsophisticated persons who may not
have actually comprehended and voluntarily dismissed the risk involved,
traditional tort law will become a historical footnote. Accordingly, Arkansas
courts must apply careful scrutiny when evaluating the facts of such cases in
order to ascertain the actual knowledge of the parties, or a simple signature
will be all that is required to eliminate the protections of traditional tort law,
and the public policy provisions imbedded therein, from all service related
transactions.
John G. Shram*
265. See Jordan, 2005 WL 984513 at *8 (Imber, J., dissenting).
266. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at *5, Jordan (04-1113).
267. See id. at *4-5.
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